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THE SADCC ECONOMIES AND SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: 
Notes Toward Cost Containment And Benefit Attainment
By Reginald Herbold Green*
We are gathered here today to try to chart a new course for the 
future of Southern Africa... We can wage a successful struggle for 
economic liberations provided we begin now, in the free states of 
Southern Africa, to plan together for our economic future.
- President Seretse Kharma of Botswana 
1979 Arusha SADCC Planning Conference
We are aware that the fundamental aim of the actions of 
destabilisation against our countries is to render SADCC non-viable 
... ports and railways, fuel depots and pipelines, bridges and 
roads, communications systems and other development projects are 
the targets...
- President Samnora Machel of Mozambique 
1983 Maputo SADCC Summit
The effects of sanctions will call for great sacrifices among our 
peoples. We cannot stand against the sanctions campaign; thus we 
call upon the rest of the world that as it exercises what it feels
to be a moral duty it should... increase support to SADCC States so
as to cushion the indirect effects of sanctions to us.
- King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho 
1985 Arusha SADCC Summit
SADCC has repeatedly called on the international community to use 
its influence to deter and halt South African aggression and 
destabilisation against its neighbours... calls for effective 
international action against apartheid... several states 
individually or collectively have instituted limited economic 
sanctions against South Africa. SADCC member States encourage 
these initiatives and urge that more effective measures be 
implemented.
- SADCC, Overview Paper for 1986 Harare 
Annual Consultative Conference
* While Professor Green is a consultant to SADCC and to some of its member 
States this paper is not based on access to SADCC or member State secret 
sources nor does it necessarily represent their positions. The exploration, 
analysis and conclusions are the personal responsibility of the author.
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Introduction: The Broader Context
This is a review of the potential costs of, responses to and gains from 
sanctions against South Africa for the independent Southern African states 
(Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe) which comprise the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). It is not a study on sanctions against South Africa more 
generally nor on South Africa’s total regional strategy of destabilisation and 
determination.
The assumptions in respect to sanctions against South Africa are:
1. that a moral and material case for them can be made in respect of the 
occupation of Namibia, regional aggression and the apartheid system - a 
case which is accepted (indeed in a majority of cases championed by SADCC 
member States);
2. and that there is a significant possibility that the present scatter of
selective sanctions by some states will grow in areas covered and states
participating;
3. with definite direct and indirect consequences on the economies of the 
SADCC states;
4. consequences which depend not only on how South Africa reacts to
sanctions but on how - and how promptly - SADCC member States respond to
the costs and opportunities from sanctions (or the real possibility of 
sanctions).
If these assumptions are reasonable, then SADCC and its member States, as well 
as their external cooperating partners and friends, are well advised to be 
making contingency plans for responding to sanctions.
South Africa’s total regional policy described in the title of a forthcoming 
study as Beggar Thy Neighbour (albeit an earthier spelling of the first word 
might convey the true viciousness of the strategy and tactics more clearly) 
and in another as "South African Hegemony" via preserved dominance, enforced 
dependence and aggressive destabilisation is relevant to the present preview
3for reasons:
1. the costs of South African aggression and destabilisation are already 
real and large (over 10% of SADCC gross output in their absence and of 
the order of 33 to 50Í for Mozambique and Angola);
2. and cannot be expected to be reduced radically unless there is a change 
of system in South Africa or a combination of national security measures, 
international sanctions against South Africa and regional economic 
delinking from RSA;
3. so that sanctions do not constitute a new cost and a new crisis injected 
into a previously stable, mutually beneficial context; but also because
4. South Africa will react against sanctions by seeking to pass costs on to 
its neighbours and - probably - by stepping up direct and proxy military 
and sabotage operations against them; so that
5. projections of the consequences of sanctions against South Africa on her 
neighbours necessarily involve at least some attention to assumed South 
African reactions and neighbour state security situations.
SADCC: The Cost Of South Africa
SADCC was founded as an integral part of the independent Southern African 
states’ attempt to liberate and to reconstruct their region. It is the 
political economic arm of regionalism but the political is not a superfluous 
adjective for SADCC any more that it was for Adam Smith or Karl Marx.
SADCC is about economic liberation which, no matter how narrowly defined, 
conflicts with making Southern Africa safe for South African exports, 
investment, profits and procurement in particular and for the apartheid system 
more generally. South Africa's total strategy views regional hegemony as 
indivisible and domination of transport as the key to enforcing hegemony. In 
this its perceptions are the mirror image of SADCC's which - in declaration, 
in programme, in mobilisation of resources and in implementation - have put 
transport and communications delinking first because the sector was (and is)
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4perceived as the keystone of South African economic dominance and capacity to 
destabilise by non-military means.
The conflict between South African and Southern African regional strategies is 
therefore both basic and antagonistic. Further it centres in large measure on 
transport and communications. Because intra SADCC regional routes would in 
general be cheaper to use than ones via RSA, could be rehabilitated and 
up-graded over 3 to 5 years in the absence of military aggression/sabotage and 
proved under SADCC's algis to have substantial external resource mobilisation 
pull, South Africa has increasingly resorted to naked physical violence to 
block economic liberation in this sector.
SADCC has estimated the 1980-84 cost of economic destabilisation and 
aggression by South Africa against its member States as of the order of 
$10,000 million (well above total foreign aid for the period) and the present 
annual cost at the order of $3,000 million. Other estimates - including one 
by the present author - are up to 50Í higher on cost to date (partly depending 
on starting date) and place present annual losses at $4,000 or even $5,000 
million. Any of these estimates implies that as of 1986 the cost of South 
Africa's undeclared war on its neighbours is running at 10% or more of what 
their output would be in the absence of that war.
This background is critical to understanding why SADCC has consistently (from 
its 1981 Blantyre Annual Consultative Conference) called for international 
pressure on South Africa and has come to view sanctions as analagous to the 
pain of a woman in labour not to that of regular beatings by thugs wielding 
sjamboks because the latter situation characterises present reality and 
sanctions are perceived as crucial to ending or at least reducing the 
intensity of the beatings. It also explains the deep distrust for propenents 
of the line that sanctions should be opposed because they would result in 
South Africa acting in ways harmful to its neighbours. Especially in the 
mouths of those who preach "constructive engagement", assist South Africa in 
destabilisation and aggression by co-financing its proxy forces, see South 
Africa as being a region including Southern Africa and/or show little other 
evidence of concern for South Africans, the argument evokes irritation at best 
and frequently -deep contempt and bitter anger as well.
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SADCC On Sanctions0 ■ —,.. ---
SADCC is very much a creation and a creature of its member States not a 
supranational entity. Thus it cannot and does not have a position different 
from them. However, it is also true that as a channel, a forum and a 
coordinating process SADCC has become more than the least common denominator 
of its member States.
From its 1981 Consultative Conference onward, SADCC has mirrored the rising 
trend of South African aggression and destabilisation by condemning them and 
calling for international action to induce/force South Africa to call a halt 
to them in language of increasing firmness. The one apparent exceptions - the 
1984 Lusaka Annual Conference - mirrors the false hope that the Lusaka/Nkomati 
Accord process represented a significant strategic change by South Africa, a 
hope which the Conference Communique expresses somewhat guardedly and which 
proved to be stillborn.
By mid-1985 six SADCC member States (the six Front Line States) were firmly on 
record as advocates of sanctions against South Africa as a means to force RSA 
to disgorge Namibia, half of its regional aggression and end apartheid. None 
saw international sanctions as sufficient conditions by themselves but as 
interacting with and complementing the actions of Liberation Movements and the 
independent states. Nor did any view them as essential to attaining the 
stated goals but as vital if the time, economic cost and - especially - human 
suffering and loss of life required to attain them were to be minimised.
Lesotho had also - in only slightly nuanced language - forcefully endorsed 
sanctions, an act of great courage on King Moshoeshoe’s part given his 
country's geographic, economic and strategic context. It had in addition made 
the most forceful presentation of the case that sanctions should not be 
allowed to crush the neighbours and opponents of apartheid while Zimbabwe had 
earlier outlined why South Africa’s neighbours could not be expected to 
introduce sanctions first nor as fully and fast as other states. Both points 
relate to the bitter fruits of sanctions against Rhodesia which were enforced 
most scrupulously by some of her neighbours and relatively speaking did more 
damage to the economies of Zambia and Mozambique than to that of Rhodesia 
(albeit they did in fact impose substantial and cumulative costs on the rebel 
regime which may well have contributed to or hastened its capitulation to
6Lancaster House style negotiations for a basic change in regime).
Malawi - previously an opponent of sanctions - has preserved a total public 
silence on its own - including not disassociating itself from SADCC conference 
on spokesmen’s pro-sanctions statements. Swaziland over 198^-85 did publicly 
oppose sanctions but apparently at the initiative of a clique led by Prince 
Mfansabili which the renewed assertion of kingly and traditional power has now 
swept aside.
As noted earlier SADCC views the present costs of destabilisation and economic 
aggression by South Africa against its member States and their regional 
economic liberation project as intolerable. It is quite open in demanding 
effective international pressure on South Africa to halt them and by 1986 in 
characterising sanctions as labour pains for a new South Africa and a new 
regional context.
SADCC takes South Africa's threat to retaliate seriously - as it has said 
South African promises are not to be taken seriously but her threats are. It 
does not suppose sanctions would be costless to it nor that they would produce 
immediate results in/on RSA. On the other hand it does see the logical 
response to sanctions as including speeding up SADCC priority programmes and 
projects which are desirable in their own right (sanctions or no sanctions, 
apartheid or African South Africa) and therefore as yielding lasting benefits 
as well as entailing costs.
A Typology Of Sanctions
Economic sanctions comprise all measures - public or private - which have a 
significant negative impact on the economy of the state against which they are 
directed and are intended to cause changes (not necessarily economic) policy 
changes by it. This is such a broad category that some brief sketch of its 
components is appropriate.
One division is official, business community, individual or non governmental 
organisation. . The first group include present military equipment and oil 
sales bans and an array of lesser measures. These have had some economic 
impact - the cost of building up domestic armaments and artificial oil
7capacity has been very large (of the order of $15,000 million minimum on 
capital account alone) and that of evading them on remaining imports quite 
significant at least until the reemergence of a buyers' market for oil and 
1983/84.
Ironically the most severe economic sanctions imposed on South Africa to date 
have been by foreign private sector investors in general and banks in 
particular. These relate to three factors, the first of which, general 
worsening of South Africa's growth and external balance position because of 
worsening terms of trade does not relate to apartheid. The second two do, 
however. One is that investors and lenders now perceive apartheid as being a 
drain on resources - both because it is inefficient in market economic terms 
and because it generates a 'need' for 'security' expenditure and because it is 
perceived as causing instability and disorder which are economically damaging 
and could escalate into a crescendo of violence which destroyed the present 
economic system. The other is the "hassle factor" - significant numbers of 
individuals, organisations and countries make difficulties for and seek not to 
do business with investors in/lenders to apartheid and these actions add to 
the cost of doing business with South Africa. The cost of lessened access to 
foreign finance and technology to RSA is severe and, if continued, will 
probably prevent a full scale, sustained recovery. It interacts with growing 
RSA large capitalist concern that digging in to defend apartheid (a secondary 
concern for them) will in fact be digging the grave of capitalism in South 
Africa (the preservation of which is their bottom line).
Personal and organisational economic sanctions fall into a different category. 
Rarely will they even cummulatively - impose severe economic costs on the 
target state. What they can do is raise consciousness so as to put pressure 
on businesses and governments to impose sanctions.
Sanctions can be partial or total (albeit the feasibility of truly total, 
global sanctions is problematic - notably in respect of gold on the export 
side). The partiality can relate to participating states - e.g. the oil 
sanctions have never been applied by all exporters nor enforced rigorously by 
some who nominally apply them. It can also relate to coverage. Partial 
sanctions may be:
a. symbolic - e.g. bans on individual, highly visible items by a few
countries (say Outspan oranges);
b. serious but far from total - e.g. military and dual purpose goods, 
petroleum and products, fruits and vegetables, new investment and loans 
as is the emerging pattern in Scandinavia;
c. strategic aimed at securing the full effects of sanctions with lesser 
organisational and implentational difficulty, e.g. military, dual purpose 
and transport-electronic-data processing goods and services (e.g. 
technology), petroleum and goods services to produce it or its 
substitutes, TNC investment and operations as implicitly proposed in the 
recent United Nations Centre on TNC’s (UNCTC) eminent persons report.
And Impact On SADCC Economies
How sanctions against RSA would affect SADCC economies depends on six factors:
First, how far reaching, effectively enforced and speedily applied they are. 
By and large greater coverage, implementation and speed of introduction - 
other things being equal will increase costs.
Second, how long they last. However, unless one assumes a very brief period 
indeed this may be less significant that it appears. The inital capital costs 
of offsetting sanctions will over time yield increasing delinking and regional 
integration gains.
Third, whether they work. Failed sanctions - especially if at the end of the 
day RSA is still operating broadly as before and the SADCC economies are left 
to its untender, unmercies - would probably have the highest medium term costs 
and the least benefits.
Fourth, whether SADCC states impose full sanctions and if so how rapidly. 
Full instant impostition would maximise costs while partial, phased imposition 
as alternatives were built up would minimise them.
Fifth, how RSA reacts. At one extreme it might merely end exports of goods 
with a high import content (notably petroleum products), phase out non-mine
9labour, cut out all non-strategic imports from the region, allow sealed car 
transit traffic to Lesotho and reduce regional military aggression to 
concentrate on the home front. At the other it might end all economic links 
and transactions (including deporting all SADCC state citizen workers) and 
step up sabotage and military aggression to create wastelands in Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia to add to its 'achievements’ in 
Mozambique and Angola. The difference in costs - and in opportunities to 
contain them - would be immense. Neither extreme is likely but the resting 
point in the spectrum is very uncertain.
Sixth, how much assistance SADCCfs cooperating partners provide for the 
capital costs of delinking, the operating costs of replacement employment 
creation for ’returning' migrant workers and enhanced security provision and 
the initial institutional and transitional costs of changing sources and 
routes. Again the range is wide and the resting place problematic. For 
example, the USA says it opposes sanctions and, therefore, if they are imposed 
after SADCC/member State advocacy it will pay nothing to offset neighbours' 
costs. The Nordic States take almost the opposite view - they favour 
international sanctions and minimisation of costs to independent Southern 
African states. In practice no position is clearcut - the USA is supporting 
Beira transport corridor projects which are objectively crucial to sanctions 
cost reduction as well as dependence reduction more generally; were initial 
2-3 year costs of sanctions to neighbours of the order of $5,000 million 
($2,000 million capital investment, $250-500 million transitional, $300-450 
million a year income and employment support for ex-migrant workers and 
$500-750 million a year to block South African and proxy sabotage and military 
aggression) it is not clear how much finance the Nordic states would perceive 
themselves as able to supply.
An Anatomy Of Costs, Cost Containment And Gain Achievement
The sectoral areas requiring attention are: imports, labour exports, other
exports, transport and communications, security and Lesotho. Each of the 
first three categories requires sub-division because, e.g. the issues in 
respect to petroleum products are significantly different from those relating 
to general consumer manufactured goods. Transport and communications is 
surveyed last among the economic sectors not because it is least important but
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for the opposite reason - it is absolutely crucial to determining what can and 
cannot be achieved in terms of cost containment and gain achievement in the 
other sectors.
Security is not treated in full - if only because of the author's limited 
knowledge of and still more limited expertise on the topic. However, it 
cannot be left out as non-economic because the main obstacles to a number of 
delinking initiatives (over 19 8 5-8 6 as well as in the event of future 
sanctions) relate to protecting what has been built and the economic context 
in which it operates (or is prevented from operating).
Lesotho is clearly not an economic sector. However, because of its geographic 
location and much greater dependent integration into the South African economy 
its situation in respect to almost every sector diverges significantly from 
that of any other SADCC member State. Therefore, it is more convenient to 
group the Lesotho sectoral impacts and treat them separately from the more 
general sectoral survey.
Imports: Petroleum Products, Electricity, General, Customs Revenue
Botswana, Swaziland (and Lesotho) are totally dependent on petroleum products 
supply from or via South Africa, Malawi significantly and Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
and Zambia marginally. Effective sanctions will cause South Africa to halt 
exports.
Rerouting and resourcing is possible. The Beira-Mutare and Dar-Ndola 
pipelines plus the Nacala-Malawi and Maputo-Manzini rail lines have more than 
enough capacity to handle the needs of all SADCC States except Angola which 
has its own refinery and Lesotho which is covered in a separate section.
The requirements for supplies to Botswana via Mutare or Ndola are additional 
tank wagons and locomotives. Additional tankage would be needed at Beira and 
Mutare or Ndola and in the main Botswana depot albeit Botswana does have 90 
days storage. Parallel consideratons apply to supplying Swaziland via Maputo 
and Malawi via 'Nacala. Alternative product sources will be readily available 
and are likely to be up to a third cheaper before and a quarter after than 
South African.
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Electricity dependence on RSA is total for Lesotho, dominant for Swaziland, 
significant for Mozambique (Maputo area) and Botswana, minor for Zimbabwe. 
Grid links could remove the Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe 
imports from RSA with cost savings over present RSA or alternative national 
sources. Basically they involve a high tension Cahora Basa - Maputo - 
Swaziland link plus high tension lines linking Cahora Basa to the Zimbabwe 
grid and Bulawayo to the Botswana grid. The capital cost would be likely to 
be of the order of $150 million and the construction time up to 24-30 months.
General import dependence on RSA is major (over 75Í) for Lesotho, Botswana and 
Swaziland, substantial (over 25Í for Zimbabwe and Malawi) and significant 
(over 5Í for Zambia and Mozambique). Alternative Sources - in several cases 
(e.g. grain, pulp, textiles, steel) regional ones and on average global 
sourcing is likely to prove at least *\0% cheaper than present patterns if 
transport is available and import sourcing is handled by knowledgeable 
commercial houses.
The absence of import houses or other enterprises able to source globally is 
near total in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. The evident solution would be 
joint ventures with European or Japanese - or perhaps Zimbabwean - firms with 
experience in and knowledge links for global, least cost purchasing. There is 
reason to suppose such ventures could be viable now even with the B-L-S states 
in the South African Customs Union.
SACU is a major revenue source for B-L-S. However, for Botswana and Swaziland 
the cash flow from it does not exceed what could be collected from a national 
import and sales tax system which - given functioning transport from SADCC 
ports and global least cost pricing - would not raise average costs to users. 
(The supposed 41Í uplift in revenue allocation is offset by other factors 
including the two year lag in payment and higher RSA prices). The requirement 
therefore is for functioning duty collection system (the recording, valuation, 
statistical and sales tax branches exist).
In respect to general SADCC State imports (and probably electricity) RSA is 
unlikely to cut off sales as a reaction against sanctions. It is more likely 
to wish to retain them to earn foreign exchange for pay for sanctions busting 
imports and to limit the damage to its export oriented agricultural and 
manufacturing sub-sectors.
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Labour Exports - Mines And Others
Official South African and SADCC member State figures suggest 280,000 to 300, 
000 migrant workers in RSA in 1984. This is an underestimate since seasonal 
(especially agricultural) and illegal (general and domestic) migrants are not 
counted on either side. A full time equivalent figure might be 400,000 to 
450,000. The countries to whom this source of employment and remittances 
(totalling perhaps $200 to $250 million in 1985) are Lesotho (for whom 
remittances plus SACU revenues related to them are of the same order of 
magnitude as Gross Domestic Product and wage employment in RSA exceeds that in 
Lesotho by at least 6 to 8 to 1), Mozambique (whose labour and transit 
services export earnings have usually exceeded those from goods and for whose 
southern zone rural households wage income from RSA has been and remains 
crucial), Botswana (on employment account, remittances total perhaps 10% of 
export earnings), Swaziland (somewhat analagous to Botswana) and Malawi 
(perhaps less critical to employment but comparable as share of earnings).
The gold mining core of the migrants are - despite Piet Wappen Botha's threats 
- unlikely to be repatriated except over an extended period. They are skilled 
and critical to sustaining gold output - presumably a priority for RSA as the 
only sanctions proof export. Most of the others might be sent home very 
rapidly subject to the caveat that the 'illegals' and seasonals might take 
time to find as they are, by definition in the first case, not registered.
There are two aspects of this problem - the loss of say $100-125 million a 
year of remittances and the need to create up to 300,000 wage or productive 
self employment opportunities over three years. The second - assuming 
targeted support to peasant agricultural opportunities for returners and their 
households, labour intensive construction, informal sector encouragement and 
labour intensive full time or seasonal public works and basic services (from 
reafforestation to primary health care) should run on the order of $300 
million a year for supporting capital, complementary inputs and public sector 
wages. Assuming it could be financed it would generate comparable additions 
to GDP as well as offsetting loss of half of remittances in domestic income 
(but not foreign exchange earning) terms.
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Exports - Other To And Through RSA
Non labour exports of SADCC to RSA are under 10Í of total exports, perhaps 
$350-400 million a year. They are significant for Lesotho (except that her 
merchandise exports as a whole are minute absolutely and relative to imports), 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Of the total perhaps a quarter we 
re-exported by South Africa so would be either rerouteable or probably 
continue to be saleable via RSA.
South African demand for the balance would fall sharply except for those which 
are non available from RSA sources (probably trivial). This would be true 
even with no retaliation - effective sanctions would reduce RSA demand, 
increase capacity underutilisation and force economising or hard currenecy 
purchases. The bulk could be retargeted - perhaps 15 to 25Í to SADCC markets 
to replace RSA exports - but in many cases at less net export proceeds and 
subject to building up or establishing links with enterprises possessing 
global marketing expertise. Perhaps 10 to 20Í of the exports would prove 
unsaleable (except to the extent that domestic demand rose), e.g. certain 
Zimbabwe labour intensive manufactures albeit the falling South African demand 
and plummeting rand over 1984-86 may already have squeezed out most of these.
Exports through RSA are in one sense a pure transport problem. Sometimes the 
problem is a very limited one as with Botswana diamonds which transit Jan 
Smuts Airport but could perfectly well go on a quarterly charter flight to 
London or a direct Gaborone-London flight once one is established. In others 
- e.g. Botswana chilled beef - it is more serious because specialised handling 
facilities not now existing on SADCC railways and at SADCC ports will be 
needed.
The reasons for concern in this sector are twofold. For some exports RSA will 
seek to apply retaliation - as it already has, e.g. by putting Botswana meat 
export wagons on sidings until the contents become putrid. For others it 
would be happy to ship them not simply to earn transit revenue but to create 




This is the key area. South Africa handles the bulk of the external traffic 
of Lesotho (100Í), Botswana (over 90Í), Swaziland and about half of that of 
Zimbabwe and Zambia - as well as of Malawi when its proxy MNR forces had 
blocked both links to Mozambique ports and before the highway to Tazara link 
to Dar had been opened.
This is the result of armed aggression and sabotage. Of the five main port 
corridors (Maputo - three lines, Beira - to Zimbabwe and Malawi, Nacala, Dar 
es Salaam and Lobito Bay) only Dar has not been attacked repeatedly. South 
Africa via UNITA has kept the Lobito Bay route closed for over a decade and 
via the MNR has at times shut down each of the Mozambique routes although 
Nacala, Beira-Zimbabwe and Maputo-Swaziland are currently functional again. 
SADCC's priority transport sector programme would if even largely rather than 
wholly implemented virtually eliminate the need to use and the economic logic 
of using RSA land transport links except for Lesotho and (on the economic 
side) Swaziland.
The SADCC Transport and Communications programme over 1985-86 has concentrated 
mobilisation of resources on the Dar and Beira corridors (the Nacala corridor 
and the Maputo-Swaziland projects already have substantial commitments). 
These would cost perhaps $750 million for projects needed to achieve basic 
rehabilitation and upgrading, implementable over 36 to 48 months.
They would create a situation in which Dar es Salaam (Tanzania, Zambia,
Malawi), Beira (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, peripherally Zambia and 
Malawi), Nacala (Malawi, Mozambique) and Maputo (Mozambique, Swaziland only) 
could handle on the order of 12 million tonnes of dry cargo and 4 to 5 million
of petroleum products and their corridors channel these to their destinations
(from their sources). That would cover the basic external trade requirements 
of the seven states (Angola has its own parts, Lesotho's traffic could go via 
Maputo if an onward route existed). That does require higher levels of 
operating and maintenance efficiency than have been attained in the recent 
past and above all security at least comparable to that Zimbabwean and 
Mozambican forces have provided to the Beira-Zimbabwe corridor since 1983. 
Were the Limpopo Valley Line (Maputo-Zimbabwe) or the Lobito Bay Line
(Zambia-Angola) to be rehabilitated, reequipped with rolling stock and
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traction power, restaffed and kept secure there would be enough leeway in 
capacity to make transport dependence a thing of the past but at least the 
Lobito Bay Line's reopening is most unlikely until there is a major change in 
the Pretoria-Washington strategies in respect to Angola.
In respect to air transport infrastructure and to telecommunications SADCC and 
it member States have already achieved or are about to complete a set of 
projects which render use of South African facilities unnecessary and - in the 
case of telecommunications generally less convenient or economic than national 
or regional ones. There are today - unlike 1980 - no major problem areas in 
the event of sanctions so long as they can be protected from sabotage.
The final transport sector problem is a specialised one - clearing and 
forwarding. The traffic of the six southern SADCC States (excluding Angola, 
Zambia and Tanzania) is dominantly cleared and forwarded by Renfreight, a 
subsidiary of SAF Marine which is controlled by Old Mutual with a minority 
Anglo American holding. In the context of sanctions this is a very dangerous 
situation. Withdrawal of RSA personnal and head office support could lead to 
chaos - clearing and forwarding are specialised, complex, vital functions. If 
Renfreight carries out business as usual, first it has a bias toward South 
African sources and routes; second, it has (even now) a 'habit' of 
mislabelling South African cargo as from another country of origin and shipped 
from a SADCC port; third, its centralised data system means that detailed data 
on the bulk of six SADCC member States external trade is available or South 
African computers to which only the most innocent could suppose the South 
African military cannot have access.
The cure - which is desirable for the same reasons plus cost and transfer 
pricing ones even without sanctions - is to build up smaller domestic or non 
RSA owned clearers and forwarders and to form joint ventures with major 
international firms in that trade - as Mozambique has recently done with AMI 
of Belgium.
Security - Room To Delink
Security as noted is not a SADCC topic. Nor is it an area of expertise of the 
present author. Finally putting detailed security contingency plans on paper
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for public advance examination would be remarkably foolish.
That said, certain comments are germane:
First, better defence of key transport routes and other major economic units 
is crucial to cost containment and benefit attainment - SADCC's failure to 
break the transport dependence stranglehold South Africa has created is not 
the result of technical, operational or financial considerations but of the 
use of naked military force (including sabotage and international terrorism, 
particularly but not exclusively in Angola and Mozambique and involving proxy, 
mercenary, special unit and regular RSA forces).
Second, selective better defence can be achieved - especially through 
coordinated action - as the reopening of the Beira and Nacala port corridors 
and Malawi-Zimbabwe highway demonstrate.
Third, more can be done along these lines - e.g. reopening the Limpopo Valley 
Line, making Maputo-Swaziland routes secure, cutting down (or radically 
raising the cost of) support to proxies by the more effective use of airpower.
Only in Angola are hostilities on a scale out of proportion to coordinated 
independent state action's potential impact.
Fourth, but to be reasonably effective such action would probably cost on the 
order of $500 million a year minimum.
Fifth, international symbolic or trip wire forces (e.g. the March 1986 
Botswana - UK SAS joint manoeuvres) might have a deterrent effect if RSA was 
genuinely concerned that the powerful external party meant business.
Sixth, an international deterrent force with airpower superior to RSA's (which 
centres on a limited number of ageing Mirage jets) backed up by specialist 
units (communications, detection artillery) and limited ground forces probably 
would deter if it were militarily credible and not of a political character 
allowing South Africa to characterise it as a Soviet advance convincingly to 
northwestern opinion.
Seventh, a larger, less sophisticated force which could and did fight could be 
an effective defence subject to the same capacity and political image
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constraints.
At present it is hard to see more than symbolic external military support in 
terms of personnel deployed. The generally acceptable sources - middle level 
European and Commonwealth states, other African states, India - are either 
unwilling to risk actual combat, unable to provide convincing forces and/or 
unable to pay or to secure international finance for a peacekeeping force that 
had to deter and/or fight (roles few if any UN peacekeepers have played since 
Conor Cruse O’Brien’s Katanga campaign). However, in a context in which 
sanctions came to be adopted this rather pessimistic assessment might need 
reconsideration.
Lesotho - The Hostage In The Mountains
Lesotho's economy is basically a long distance bed-sitting room for the rand. 
The nation is geographically not merely land locked but also South African 
locked.
In 1986 a brief and partial South African economic blockade was followed by a 
para military coup. Granted Leabua Jonathan's attempt to create a Tonton 
Macjonathan youth guard responsible only to himself was the underlying cause 
and granted that the accession to sovereign power of King Moshoeshoe means 
South Africa has scored an own goal in facilitating the substitution of a more 
nationalist and more popular government - the potential for turning Lesotho 
into an isolated, starving concentration camp exists.
In only a limited number of sectors are practicable domestically based 
solutions identifiable. Electricity self sufficiency and some agricultural 
output enhancement could be secured from the Oxbow project (not the RSA linked 
Highland Water project). A re-employment programme - which would have to be 
externally funded - could improve (rehabilitate) the ecology, increase food 
production and enhance basic services but not lay the foundation for a 
diversified economy or alternative sources of foreign exchange earnings.
To break a blockade would require an international airlift of up to 400,000 
tonnes a year (i.e. a shuttle service from Maputo to Lesotho's new 
international airport requiring fifty odd 20 tonne capacity cargo planes
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including back up as almost all the volume would be inward bound imports 
dominated by food and petroleum). Technically this is feasible. Politically, 
RSA would be unlikely to shoot down western commercial aircraft flying 
pre-announced routes. The evident problem is financial as costs could easily 
exceed $150 million a year.
But would such an Armagedonesque scenario take place? Crushing Lesotho and 
starving the Basotho would appear to offer South Africa few gains and 
significant costs. It needs the gold miners and if it continues to employ 
them presumably would wish to sell an equivalent (to remittances) value to 
Lesotho. A starving mob of over a million Basotho would in fact increase 
security risks as well as bringing international obloguy and anger which might 
result in tighter sanctions and/or other measures against RSA.
Therefore it is conceivable that RSA would continue to hire many Basotho (at 
least in gold mining) and to supply most imports (if paid in remitted rand or 
hard currency). It might even allow some sealed transit traffic (e.g.
petroleum products from Maputo) over its railway system. That scenario would
not be costless - at least half the Basotho employed in RSA would probably
lose their jobs - and is probably too optimistic just as the first tilts too 
far toward doomsday.
The conclusion would appear to be that technically a great deal can be done to 
contain costs to Lesotho but only with very high levels of external support. 
Even then net costs will be more severe than for any other SADCC member State.
Total Costs: A Guesstimate
Any estimate of total costs is a guesstimate because so many factors which 
will influence the actual outturn are problematic in the extreme. The 
following order of magnitude ranging shot assumes:
1. reasonably comprehensive, effective global sanctions;
2. lasting at least three years and not abandoned in despair or renewed 
"constructive engagement" (destructive collaboration from a SADCC
perspective);
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3. phasing in of sanctions by SADCC States;
4. South African economic reaction against SADCC States largely determined
by its own economic interests not by damage to neighbours maximisation;
5. a significant SADCC programme of alternative construction and operation 
as well as resourcing/redestining and rerouting external economic 
transactions;
6. security measures adequate to allow operation of all main Indian Ocean 
SADCC transport corridors and to reduce general economic distabilisation 
via aggression radically in Mozambique and to limit its increase from 
present (very low) levels in Botswana, Zimbawe and Zambia.
On that basis the costs might be:
A. Capital $2,000-2,500 million over three years dominated by Dar es Salaam, 
Nacala, Beira and Maputo corridor transport projects (including rolling 
stock, lorries and the two pipelines plus associated tank farms) with 
electricity transmission facilities second.
B. Initial Dislocation and Institution Creation $250-500 million over three
years relating primarily to initial higher costs of stop gap sourcing,
selling and transporting while alternatives are built up and secondarily
to institution building costs and replacement of South African export 
credits.
C. Alternative Employment Generation for ’returned’ migrant workers (at
assumed levels of 200,000, 250,000 and 300,000 over the first three
years) $1,000 million ($350, $350 and $300 million about one half capital 
and are half wages not covered from sale of output). This is a very rough 
guesstimate indeed assuming that most - but not all - non gold mine 
workers will be repatriated but few of the latter and that an average 
capital cost of $1,600 an employee will generate labour intensive 
agricultural, urban informal, construction and public service employment 
with total employee/self employed income by year three of perhaps $400 
million of which $150 million public service (full time and seasonal)
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wages.
D. Security Enhancement $1,750 million over three years ($750, $500, $500 
million including equipment and installations). This is in one sense an 
unrealistic figure in that it is not clear that the independent state 
armed forces could train the numbers of personnel and utilise the 
equipment implicit in these figures if it is assumed no foreign forces 
are brought in as ’block forces'. However, it could roughly cover a 
10,000 - 15,000 addition to first line combat ready personnel in
Mozambique (to reopen the Limpopo Valley Line and put South Africa's MNR 
proxies business as a macro-economic or macro-security threat), a 
5,000-10,000 augmentation of Zimbabwe-Botswana forces on that combined 
border which could probably limit escalation of aggression albeit not 
prevent hit and run strikes and a modest increase in jet fighter 
(especially night fighter) capacity to block support of proxies by 
unarmed night flights and of raids by helicopters or propeller craft 
unescorted by front line jet fighters (which RSA is probably unwilling to 
risk). The cost of a 'block force' depends on what troops are used (e.g. 
Indian would be less cost than Swedish) and whether it is seen as a trip 
wire (minimum cost but not likely to work), a deterrent (higher cost but 
little fighting if effective) or an actual combat force (the hardest to 
raise and the costliest in casualties). It would probably be 
substantially higher than the figure cited but would presumably be borne 
internationally not by SADCC member states.
E. Lesotho - $250 to $500 million over three years over and above support of 
employment creation. The higher estimate assumeds a major airlift 
operation and the latter a selective one plus sealed rail wagon transport 
of other imports via Maputo through the RSA rail system to Maseru. 
Either would require significant initial investment - in rolling stock 
and traction power, warehouses, air freight handling facilities and/or 
cargo aircraft - as well as higher annual transport costs especially as 
either operation might well need to be 'Foreign Flag' as to equipment and 
foreign staffed at top levels to force RSA to give it grudging 
acceptance.
F. Subtotal - $5,250-6,250 million over three years direct costs. The 
indirect cost total and the net cost total depend on two factors - how
21
much of the direct cost is internationally financed as additional support 
for the independent states of Southern Africa (and thus does not have 
opportunity costs from diversion) and how many gains can be achieved. No 
.meaningful estimates of the level of international support can be made at 
present. If attempts were made doubtless a ’realistic' estimate would be 
below $1,000 million. But at present sanctions, as defined, are not 
’realistic’ either. When and if they become so then the support for the 
regional economic liberation project would probably be significantly 
higher.
G. Gains would come on net lower import costs, net additional export markets 
or prices for existing production (probably a small negative), replacing 
RSA exports in overseas markets, lower transport costs, benefits of 
additional regional import substitution and the output of the newly 
employed workers. Rough orders of magnitude by year three might be:
1. import cost savings - $200 million
(10% average on imports from or through RSA)
2. export gains (existing products) - ($ -25 to -50) million 
(some existing existing exports to RSA would
be hard to redestine and in general prices 
would be lower)
3. export gains from replacing RSA in overseas markets - $25 million 
(real possibilities exist in metals, steel, coal,
asbestos, etc., but capitalising on them over three 
years would be limited by existing production and 
available transport capacity)
4. lower transport - $75-150 million
(for Zimbabwe alone of the order of $75 million 
on full division; achieved level depends on 
transport sector capacity and security)
5. additional regional production to replace South African - $50 million 
(as with "c” three year result limited by capacity)
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6. Output of returned workers (net) - $300 million
(of which say $150 public sector wages, $125-175 million 
peasant production, $75-100 million informal 
sector output and $50-75 million enterprise wages 
assumed justified by higher output less $125 million 
remittances loss)
7. Improved security - $200 million
(a conservative estimate of $250 million gain 
in Mozambique, partly offset by losses in other 
neighbours of RSA. This is a by-product of the 
security improvement necessary for transport sector 
alternative to work).
Total $750 - 900 million
H. Net Cost Year Three Recurrent $25 to Gain $125 million
Total Cost $1275 - 1425 million.
These are very rough estimates indeed. They may be on the optimistic
side. However, they are a not totally unrealistic set of ’target' 
levels.
Several points arise from inspection of these cost data. First, by year three 
the recurrent net cost is the result of Lesotho and security operations; 
without them there would be recurrent net gain of $575-725. Second, after the 
third year, costs should not (in real terms) rise while benefits should. 
Third, excluding security and Lesotho operations, the overall additional cost 
(financing requirement for capital investment) is of the order of $4 7 5 -6 2 5  
million and should thereafter decline as the initial hump of transport and 
power substitution capital expenditure was surmounted and net recurrent
benefits rose. Four, the gross annual costs - let alone the net - are much 
smaller than the ongoing costs of South Africa's present level of
destabilisation and aggression and are therefore logically well worth 
incurring - if financeable - in support of measures which have a real chance 
of ending those actions.
Assuming either that sanctions forced the disgorgement of Namibia and cold
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t* detente in the region with limited change - i.e. not a true majority rule
state in South Africa - the SADCC member States would be large net gainers 
from that point on as the security and (presumably) Lesotho costs would fall 
away, most of the gains continue to rise and the present destabilisation bill 
run down moderately rapidly as the new damage ended and the consequences of 
the old were overcome.
Assuming South Africa did become a majority rule state - presumably under an 
ANC and UDF led government - SADCC would still have lasting gains. The 
capital spending would have been on transport and production capacity 
justified even assuming natural economic relations with South Africa. The 
trade links justified on long term mutual interest grounds could be relatively 
easily restored. No majority rule government in South Africa would agree to 
the return of the migrant workers given South Africa’s block unemployment and 
underemployment position so the funds deployed to reintegrate them into their 
home economies would remain justified. Finally, only once SADCC as a region 
has built the degree of economic integration and autonomy required by the 
measures sketched earlier would a regional economic grouping with South Africa 
(either as an 11th SADCC member - Namibia being the 10th - or as a partner in
a two member South Africa/SADCC grouping) be likely to avoid building in
dominance and dependency relations inherited from the old RSA however much 
both the SADCC members and the new South Africa wished to avoid it.
What Is SADCC Doing?
SADCC is well aware of the need to contain costs and attain gains when and if 
effective sanctions are imposed against South Africa. It is also aware of the 
problematic nature of many of the projections which are heavily dependent on 
timing, coverage, RSA reaction and security assumptions. Until 1985 little 
SADCC contingency planning for sanctions (and after 1978-79 little member 
State contingency planning for them) was done because the degree of consensus 
in favour of sanctions within SADCC was not as strong as it became at the 1985
Arusha Summit and - even more - because there was no realistic prospect of
serious international economic sanctions in the foreseeable medium term after 
1979/80 and before 1985.
From the Arusha Summit, SADCC has begun work on contingency planning and its
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pre-sanctions implementation. Details are - quite appropriately - secret and 
the work is still very much in progress but several elements and directions 
are known, indeed made public by SADCC.
First, a SADCC member State subcommittee has been created to prepare an 
overall strategic approach for SADCC responses to sanctions against South 
Africa and has held several meetings at official and ministerial level.
Second, several detailed background papers have been prepared and specific 
topical consultancies commissioned - with a limited number of exceptions from 
SADCC state citizens and institutions.
Third, a comprehensive draft sanctions response project is expected to be 
presented to the 1986 Luanda SADCC Summit for consideration by Heads of State 
and of Government whose decisions will guide its further refinement.
Fourth, while the anatomy of areas of vulnerability to costs and opportunities 
for gains (and especially the cost and benefit estimates) are those of the 
present author many (probably most) are known to figure on SADCC's list.
Fifth, in particular SADCC is known to be giving priority attention to 
transport routes allowing delinking from South Africa and to providing 
security for them, to petroleum and electricity questions and to developing 
institutional (enterprise) alternatives to South African or South African 
focused firms in the import/export and clearing and forwarding sectors. 
Similarly Lesotho's requirements as a special (extreme) case have received 
attention at the SADCC Summit and the 1986 Harare Annual Consultative 
Conference (including reference to an airlift) and would therefore presumably 
be articulated by the sub-committee.
Sixth, the 1985-86 emphasis on the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport corridors 
is in effect selective speeding up of the two project groups which are most 
crucial for making cost containment and benefit attainment possible and which 
have the longest load time before operationality. Highly desirable in any 
event they become crucial in the sanctions context if RSA is at that point 
still blocking the Limpopo Valley and Lobito Bay lines.
Seventh, while security is not a SADCC sector, the member States have begun to
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take actions to upgrade security especially for key economic units. The most 
evident are the joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean operations which have secured the 
Beira corridor, reopened the Malawi-Zimbabwe highway, and - perhaps less 
securely - allowed restarting of upgrading/rehabilitation of the Nacala 
corridor rail line as well as reopening it to traffic. The March 1986 
Botswana-British SAS joint manoeuvres (clearly designed to play a war game 
against potential trans-border incursions and/or 'contrived insurgency1) is 
the most notable example of an attempt to secure at least a symbolic 'trip 
wire' involvement by nations whose diplomatic, economic and military strength 
South Africa cannot afford to ignore.
In total therefore SADCC appears to have moved rapidly to act on its new 
perception that sanctions against South Africa were becoming a real 
possibility. Its attention is now focused on cost containment via speeding up 
of key elements of SADCC's Lusaka Programme of Action. By definition that 
approach to cost containment can be expected to lead to benefit attainment. 
As of early 1986 the process of contingency planning had shifted from 
generalities to specific topics - indeed two of SADCC's 1985-1986 focal areas 
for securing external support, the Dar and Beira corridors are among the most 
essential components of a coordinated response to sanctions.
(This paper was written by 
Prof. R. H. Green and 
transcribed in his absence)
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